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Abstract
In this article author investigate how social media was utilized and appropriated in the electoral
reform movement in Malaysia called Bersih. By identifying and analyzing roles of three dominant
social platforms in the Bersih movement, namely blogging, Facebook, and Twitter, author reveal
that social media is both the site and part of the contestations of power Social media is integral
to the shaping of Bersih movement's imaginaries, practices, and trajectories. As a social and
material artifact, every technological platform such as blogging, Facebook, and Twitter has its
own socio-political properties that postulate distinctive roles and limitations for its users.
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Introduction
It was 1.45 pm in Kuala Lumpur. The Light Rail Transit (LRT) station at Pasar Seni was unusually
busy. A crowd of thousands, mostly young, walked towards the Dataran Merdeka, a historic
square once a focal point and cricket pitch for the British colonial presence in Malaysia. Wearing
“Bersih 3.0” T-shirts, some of which were green, they looked high-spirited. Along the walk there
were some young men handing out free bottles of mineral water. Various slogans were shouted:
“Bersih! Bersih! We want fair and clean elections! Reformasi! Reform!”
After more than twenty minutes of walking, the crowd was forced to stop. Apparently the road
was blocked by about 100 riot police. One of the Bersih leaders told the crowd to sit down and
let the Bersih leaders proceed to Dataran Merdeka. The protesters followed the order brie y but
they quickly became restless. Many started walking to multiple directions. A small crowd was
walking towards the Masjid Jamek LRT station,  ve-minutes walk away from Dataran Merdeka,
and soon the crowd grew larger and larger.
At 2.15 pm, the Masjid Jamek station had become over crowded. At 2.34 pm, Bersih chairperson
Ambiga Sreenevasan took a megaphone and announced that the rally had been a great
success telling the crowd to disperse. The insistent crowd responded by chanting: Dataran!
Dataran! The chanting turned to panic when a warning shot was  red and tear gas was
deployed. People screamed. Smoke was everywhere. It started looking like a war zone.
The excerpt above is taken from a  eld-note author wrote while observing and ‘experiencing’
the Bersih 3.0 rally in Malaysia on 28 April 2012. Author saw the crowd in green Bersih 3.0 T-
shirts. Author heard people chanting. Author saw protesters dispersed as the police started
 ring tear gas canisters and water canons. People cheering, loud gunshots, smoke rising, the
crowd screaming, author witnessed them all. Yet, author was not ‘there’. Author did not
physically experience any of these. Being 9,000 miles away, author was sitting in front of my
computer with multiple windows opened on the monitor screen. Author saw the six-hour protest
journey, from 1 pm to 7 pm, developing over time from multitudes of tweets, links, photos, and
videos transmitted from the streets of Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Johor Baru. The impressive
amount of live reporting made a real time observation possible. Within 24 hours, there were
over 300,000 tweets, 2,000 YouTube videos, and 300 relevant blog posts posted online. This
could possibly be one of the most recorded popular protests of the year.
Coming from the Malay word for ‘clean’, Bersih is a popular name for “The Coalition of Free and
Fair Elections” attempting to reform the electoral system in Malaysia by addressing pervasive
electoral misconducts to sweep any ‘unclean’ practices to ensure free and fair election. Many
credited the  rst Bersih rally in 2007 as a major contributing factor to a shift in the political
landscape in the 2008 election where the ruling coalition Barisan National failed to obtain a
two-third super majority for the  rst time since 1969. The third and the largest rally, Bersih 3.0 in
2012, just a year before the next election, can be credited for not only mobilizing the highest
voter turnout in the Malaysian history but also with the relative success of an opposition
coalition Pakatan Rakyat. Although the ruling coalition still secured the majority of seats, the
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opposition won 50.9% of the popular vote (SPR, 2013). By the time of writing this article, Bersih
movement just held its fourth mass rally, Bersih 4.0, on August 2015, calling not only for a clean
election but also the resignation of Prime Minister Najib Razak.
Beyond Bersih, the use of digital media for political activism in Malaysia has a long and
impressive trajectory. It began with the use of the pre-social media internet during the
Reformasi (a Malay word meaning ‘reform’ in English) movement in 1998 [1,2] that took place
concurrently with a similar movement in Indonesia where the internet also played a substantial
role [3,4]. Malaysian Reformasi movement refers to the movement that began in the wake of the
former Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohammad’s controversial dismissal of his deputy, Anwar
Ibrahim, in September 1998. This movement called for social and political reforms that opposed
Mahathir’s ‘cronyistic’ responses to the  nancial crisis [5]. Since the late 1990s, Southeast Asia
has been among places with the most vibrant digital activism. The world history of digital media
and political activism that started with the 1994 Zapatista uprising [6,7], however, has
predominantly centered on North America, Europe, and, recently, the Middle East, marginalizing
stories coming from the Southeast Asian context [1].
In this article, author examine and contextualize the role(s) of the internet and social media as
being manifested in the on-theground activism and embedded in the contour of societal
changes and transformations. The main method used in this research is online/of ine
observation that involves ‘hanging out’ in both nongeographical (online) and geographical (in
Kuala Lumpur) spaces. Online observation was conducted by joining online communities (e.g.
Bersih Facebook pages/groups) and subscribing to top Malaysian socio-political blogs and news
portals (they were selected based on their ranks on Alexa.com). Field notes were written as
narratives of observations and the texts of relevant online communications were recorded
electronically. Author also collected Twitter and Facebook data, especially during the Bersih 3.0
rally, to augment my  eld notes and to speci cally analyze the patterns of usage of these tools
prior and during the rallies.
Media technologies have always been part of social movements. Insurgent movements would
naturally embrace the medium that suits people most. Malaysia is no exception; every single
major wave of protests in Malaysia is associated with lively alternative media. In the early 20th
century, Malay journalists, poets and essayists played important roles in radicalizing the Malay
majority and developing the anti-colonial sentiment against the British Empire. In the 1998
Reformasi, the opposition group made an intensive use of online alternative news to contest the
ruling regime. Social media therefore is an obvious media of choice for the twenty  rst century
urban activism such as the Bersih movement. In examining and contextualizing the roles of
social media in Malaysian politics through the case of Bersih movement, my main question is:
What role did social media play in the formation and development of the movement?
In the following section I offer a brief historical overview of the internet development its
entanglement with political activism in the country to help contextualizing the role of social
media in the Bersih movement.
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Online Activism in Malaysia
The history of the internet in Malaysia begins in 1990 when Jaring, the  rst ISP (Internet Service
Provider), was launched. In 1995, TMNet, the Malaysia’s second ISP, was born, followed by a
growth of internet hosts in 1996. Since then there has been a steady rise in internet access for
both commercial and residential uses. As of June 2015, Malaysia's broadband household
penetration rate is 70.4% with 23 million users representing 77.6% of the population [8], a
tremendous gain from only 3.7 million in 2000 [9].
The Malaysian government has always been an enthusiastic supporter of the technology from
the beginning and has invested enormously in the internet infrastructure. The Multimedia Super
Corridor (MSC), a ‘cyber region’ located in the south of Kuala Lumpur, was established in 1996,
the MSC as a “global center for multimedia technologies and content” and “its aims was to
‘leapfrog’ Malaysia from the Industrial Era to an Information Era” [9]. In spite of its unfailing
support for the development of the internet, the government continues to feel ambivalent about
its political and social signi cances. It has always been torn between the desire to promote the
technology for economic prosperity and shield its citizens from being exposed to ‘unwanted
information’. Meanwhile, the history of online activism in Malaysia can be traced back to 1995,
when the technology emerged as the platform for free discussion in the country’s otherwise
tightly controlled media environment. While Malaysian law allowed for strict controls of print
media since 1984, the government decided not to censor the internet. A provision of the
Communication and Media Act (CMA) in 1998 explicitly states that nothing in the Act “shall be
construed as permitting the censorship of the internet” (Article 3). In practice, however, the
internet is not free. The government can use other media-related and libel law against any
parties who have different voices than the authorities. Examples of such laws: 1960 Internal
Security Act, 1967 Police Act, 1966 Societies Act, 1971 Sedition Act, 1972 Of cial Secrets Act,
1984 Printing Presses and Publication Act and the 2012 amendment to the 1950 Evidences Act,
Section 114A.
The political usage of the internet in Malaysia was notable in the 1998 Reformasi movement
when it became the principal means of communication among activists and an alternative
source of information and news for Malaysians [10]. Although the movement did not lead to any
regime change, it gave birth to Malaysia’s online activism and rejuvenated civil society activism
in the country [10,11]. Malaysiakini, the country’s most progressive and powerful alternative
online media, was founded during the Reformasi in 1999 and survived both political and
 nancial struggles to establish its place in the national media landscape. In March 2015,
Malaysiakini was ranked 14  most visited website in Malaysia while the pro-government Star
Online ranked 15  (Alexa.com). Also founded during the Reformasi is Harakah Daily, an online
news outlet for the oppositional party, Parti Islam seMalaysia, which quickly became the most
sophisticated and content-rich partisan website [12]. Other prominent ones include: a website
of a pro-justice NGO Aliran.com, a human right website Suaram.net, and various websites of the
Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force), a coalition of NGOs who advocate on behalf of Malaysia’s
th
th
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(largely Hindu) Indian community [13]. By facilitating the emergence of these alternative media,
the internet “allows for the creation of community of interest … [that] is directly related to the
reconstruction of the off-line community of the Malaysian nation” [14].
In 2000, following the imprisonment of a Reformasi movement leader Anwar Ibrahim, streets
protests were virtually disappeared. The decline of Reformasi as a street activism, however, did
not coincide with the decline of online activism. Pro-reform activists continued using the digital
media space as their subaltern counterpublic space, an alternative space to the dominant
bourgeois public sphere to cultivate hidden transcripts to communicate, deliberate, post and
spread information online [15]. The alternative online media sphere continued to “ground its
online activities in everyday politics” [16], paved the way for the emergence of the blogosphere
activism in 2002 and provided the basis and ingredients for the making of Bersih movement.
Here author argue that two decades of Malaysian online-of ine activism since 1990s provided a
groundwork for the relative success of present day Bersih movement.
The Bersih Movement
Bersih is an alliance of 62 non-governmental organizations seeking to reform the national
electoral system of cially formed on 23 November 2006. The call of Bersih can be summarized
in eight points: clean the electoral roll to be free from irregularities; reform postal ballot system to
ensure that all citizens are able to exercise their right to vote; use of indelible ink; free and fair
access to media; 21 days minimum campaign period; strengthen and reform public institutions
to act independently, uphold laws, and protect human rights; stop corruption; and stop dirty
politics. The  rst four points were put forward in 2007, the rest were added in 2011.
Bersih’s focus on electoral reform is largely related to the fact that in the last forty years
Malaysia has been ruled by the National Front or Barisan National (BN), the world’s longest
ruling coalition, led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the world’s longest
ruling party. Under BN’s leadership, Malaysia’s economic development had been outstanding
and the middleclass population is growing rapidly. Its economic development, however, is not
followed by political change [17]. BN bases its political legitimacy upon outstanding economic
performance and popular sovereignty gained from winning the majority of electoral votes, even
though multiparty elections were far from fully free or fair [11]. Until the 2008 Elections, BN’s
performance had been strong where in every single election it always gained about two third (or
more) of the popular votes. For Bersih, consequently, electoral reform is seen as a pathway
toward changes in politics and society.
The long domination of BN cannot be separated from the issue of race and ethnicity. As a
multiracial society, Malaysia is divided along racial lines. BN was originally conceptualized as a
confederation political parties-the United Malays National Organization, the Malaysian Chinese
Association, and the Malaysian Indian Congress-representing three main ethnic groups in
Malaysia, namely Malays, Chinese, and Indians. BN adapted the colonial practice of racial
politics, ‘divide-and-rule’, to keep apart various ethnic groups politically, economically, and
socially and to justify its image as the guardian of social and racial harmony [18]. The racial riot
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of 1969 haunts the Malaysian psyche and it is frequently used in general elections to discourage
people from exercising their electoral choice. In the of cial record, the Sino-Malay sectarian
violence that broke out on 13 May 1969, occurred in the aftermath of the 1969 general election
where the opposition parties won against the ruling coalition Alliance Party, a former name of
BN.
While Bersih de nes itself as a non-partisan civil society movement, its prime supporters are the
three main Malaysian oppositional political parties-Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS),
Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), which together formed the
opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR), meaning ‘People’s Pact’ or ‘People’s Alliance’. Bersih’s
development, in some ways, goes hand in hand with the emergence and trajectory of PR.
Arguably, Bersih’s relatively successful multi-ethic mobilization cannot be separated from the
involvement of PR. While the movement itself has not been successful in ushering Malaysia to a
post racial era, Bersih leaders and activists continuously attempted to go beyond a racial
division in mobilizing their supporters.
Public protests were a rarity in Malaysia. In 1998-1999 there were some sparks of street
activism with the emergence of Reformasi movement; and, yet, the authorities successfully
cracked them down. Since 2000, the Malaysian streets had become sterile, apolitical. Except the
anti Iraq protests in 2003, there was no major protest took place in 2000 to 2006. The 2007
Bersih rally and subsequent street protests that followed (such as Hindraf rallies, Repeal the
Internal Security Act rally, the Occupy Dataran) had turned this upside down. The  rst public
demonstration in November 2007 drew about 40,000 participants [19]. The second rally in July
2011 still drew about 50,000 protesters, despite being deemed illegal by the government who
combated the protesters with the riot squad, tear gas, and street arrests [20]. Marked by road
blockages, riot police, tear gas, and water canon, the 2012 Bersih 3.0 rally drew around 150,000
to 200,000 protesters [21].
In the face of government’s crackdowns and criminalization, the movement turned out to be
increasingly popular and became a signi cant social and political force in Malaysia. More than
just a movement for electoral reforms, Bersih also contributed to the increase levels of political
participation among young urban Malaysians, as re ected in the 2013 General Election’s voter
turnout. More importantly, even though BN secured a majority of seats (60%) to form the federal
government, it gained a mere 47.4% of the popular vote while the oppositional coalition, PR,
won 50.9% [22]. For BN, this was the worst election result since 1969.
The use of social media for political activism in the context of Bersih should also be understood
vis-à-vis government’s control over public gatherings in physical spaces. While the constitution
grants freedom of assembly and association, it provides for restrictions deemed necessary in the
interests of security, public order, or morality, often through the use of the 1967 Police Act. This
act de ned a public assembly as a gathering of  ve or more persons that required a police
permit. Just months after the Bersih 2.0 rally, the government amended the Police Act. The new
act, the 2012 Peaceful Assembly Act (PAA), was drafted to replace Section 27 of the Police Act,
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which means police permits for mass assemblies is no longer required. Organizers, however,
must notify the police within 10 days before the gathering date and the police will respond to
the noti cation while imposing restrictions and conditions [23]. The PAA also bans any
assembly in the form of street protest and any gatherings within 50 meters of ‘prohibited places’
such as airports, petrol stations, hospitals, railway stations, places of worships, and schools.
Critics called the PAA ‘undemocratic’ and perceived it as more restrictive that the previous Act.
With such restrictions, mobilizing public protest was extremely discouraged. Due to limitations
and barriers from using physical space, Bersih activists turned to digital space for planning and
mobilizing the rallies as well as expanding and sustaining the movement. Despite the ban,
Bersih rallies continued to take place publicly, on the streets and in the squares.
#Bersih on Social Media
Bersih had embraced digital media since it was established in 2006. Over ensuing years,
however, its digital media operations have undergone an evolution. At the beginning of its
development, Bersih made use of websites, blogging, and YouTube as its main tools for
deliberation and mobilization, with intermittent uses of Flickr. Blogging was a natural choice as
Bersih was formed during the peak of Malaysian political blogging. The incorporation of
YouTube and Flickr in 2006, as well as Facebook in 2008 and Twitter in 2011, unsurprisingly,
followed the surfacing and popularity of these tools among Malaysians, especially the
Malaysian youth.
Many social networking tools are uniformly called ‘social media’. Nonetheless, each is a
particular social and material artifact with its own socio-political properties that postulate
distinctive affordances and limitations for its users. Each, therefore, might contribute a unique
set of roles for the Bersih movement. What are these roles? In order to answer this question,
instead of treating social media as monolithic, author examine how each of the three dominant
platforms, namely blogging, Facebook, and Twitter, interacts with and contribute to the
movement. Author do so by tracing the roles of these platforms in shaping the movement from
its genesis through its successive developments to its unfolding as interconnected events over a
period of time.
While not discussed individually, Author also recognize the importance of YouTube and Flickr. In
Bersih movement these platforms were generally used as placeholders-though most popular
YouTube videos could generate voluminous comments -for videos and photos, some of which
were subsequently disseminated through blogs, Facebook, and Twitter.
Blogging
The role of blogging in the Bersih movement cannot be separated from the continuous existence
of the contentious blogosphere in Malaysia since 2002 [24]. Most Malaysian blogs were not
political, but many top bloggers were. A 2007 survey by Sabahan. com [25] identi ed 9 out of
Malaysia’s top 50 bloggers as political bloggers. My further examination revealed that 8 out of
these 9 bloggers were critical of BN. The Bersih movement itself was partially born out of social
3/4/2018 Sweeping the Unclean: Social Media and the Bersih Electoral Reform Movement in Malaysia | Open Access Journals
http://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/sweeping-the-unclean-social-media-and-the-bersih-electoral-reformmovement-in-malaysia.php?aid=… 8/20
interactions within the Malaysian political blogosphere. Among top bloggers there were Bersih
leaders and prominent activists such as Anwar Ibrahim, Lim Kit Siang, Jeff Ooi, and Raja Petra
Kamaruddin.
Labeled as ‘citizen journalism’, blogging is perceived as a powerful medium to positively
transform politics, civil society, and mainstream media [26]. Gillmor [26] argues that by allowing
the audience to participate in the production and dissemination of information and to engage in
discussions and debate free from the gatekeeping practices, blogging provides an avenue for a
new form of grassroots journalism and contributes to the plurality of voices. However, others
argue that political bloggers’ ideological biases tend to promote polarization [27]. Indeed,
research in the American [28,29] and Iranian [30] contexts show that blogging community
appeared to be polarized along party or ideological lines. Research on the blogosphere in
Indonesia [31] and Saudi Arabia [32,33], however, reveals more nuanced and complex pictures.
In these context, blogosphere is neither a novel public sphere where rational communicative
discourse take place nor an ideologically driven polarized sphere. But, rather, it is a sphere with
plurality of voices, allowing for differences, nuances, and even counter-hegemonic voices to
collectively emerge.
The early Malaysian blogosphere was not an ideal public sphere founded on rational-critical
discourse [34] where everyone is an equal participant as envisioned by Gilmor [26]. However,
instead of being fragmented and/or polarized along the party or ideological lines, the early
Malaysian blogging community was united by its opposition to the ruling elites. From 2002 to
2007, the blogosphere was both a vital space for online dissidents and a place where the
Malaysian government exercised its hegemonic power. Despite the government’s crackdown
and arrest of blogger activists, the Malaysian blogosphere continued to be politically vibrant. By
2007, the Malaysian blogosphere had developed to new opportunities for citizen activism. The
blogosphere facilitated activists to discuss and identify the ‘repertoire of contention’ [35] - which
refers to the set of various tools and actions available to a movemen-and issues that were
important for publics. The years of political conversations that thrived in the blogosphere had
enabled a brokerage [35] that allowed people to organize and assimilate their experiences and
deliberate beyond existing political boundaries. Civil society in Malaysia was typically
characterized as being divided along ethnic lines. Blogging, however, brought together
otherwise disconnected Malaysian activists and concerned individuals with different ideologies
(e.g. Islamist, secular, or liberal) and backgrounds (e.g. Malay, Chinese, or Tamil/Indian) and thus
contributed to the expansion of the reformist network. Blogging provided a complementary site,
visà- vis a physical site, for reformists to cultivate alternative, or even radical, imagination that
led to the birth of the Bersih movement.
With the peak of the blogging popularity, the 2007 Bersih rally was largely socialized and
mobilized online using websites and blogs. Unsurprisingly, Malaysian bloggers were
geographically clustered, with over 60 percent of them were located in Kuala Lumpur and
Selangor [36]. Ulcny’s [37] study estimated that “500 to 1000 bloggers constituted the active
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Malaysian [sociopolitical] blogosphere, with a small, very active core of 75 to 100 bloggers. The
 rst Bersih and Hindraf rallies in 2007 were the most popular topics in this sphere, generating
1080 posts and 1527 posts respectively [37].
During the course of the movement, blogs were heavily used before, during, and after the big
rallies. An of cial Bersih website was used to amplify and extend traditional communication
efforts in conventional mode of action (e.g. press release). Bersih participants made use of their
personal blogs to mobilize campaigns and to report from the streets in an effort to counter
state-controlled media interpretations of the events and capitalize on any con icts or incidents
in the protests (such as the arrest or the abuse).
In the 2007 Bersih protests, mainstream media painted a negative portrayal of a group of
activists running amok in the center of Kuala Lumpur and caused bad traf c problems [38-40].
The Bersih movement was labeled as illegal, forbidden, and even prohibited by the (Islamic)
faith (haram) [38,39]. Bloggers countered the coverage by posting their own pictures of the
peaceful marches alongside video clips from Al Jazeera and BCC exposing the police’s heavy-
handed actions against demonstrators.
A similar incident happened in days after the Bersih 2.0 rally in July 2011 when the Home
Minister Hishammuddin Hussein released a statement that there was no ‘police brutality’ and
that action would be taken against online media and bloggers if they had posted false reports
[41]. Despite the threat, thousands of bloggers responded to this statement by
contemporaneously posting photos and YouTube videos to create a visual archive of the
‘brutality’ of the riot police. Alternative media portals such as Malaysiakini and Harakah Daily
supported this collective action of bloggers by further amplifying their voices through their
media coverage. By so doing, the bloggers were not only successful in countering the
government’s narrative they were also triumphant in generating public sympathy and making it
dif cult for the government to target any individual blogger. By generating alternative discourse,
Bersih bloggers challenged conventional political and media authorities. The symbiosis between
activists and blogosphere resulted in a new form of engagement, an online civic space that was
both subversive and empowering and helped reformers to de ne and construct meaning for the
movement’s participants.
“Social movements start from [the] ability to imagine” [42]. In societies where dissents are
repressed, such as in Malaysia, “power is exercised through the propagation of dominant
sociopolitical imaginaries that leave no space for alternative, radical imaginaries to develop”
[43]. To radically depart from the dominant imaginary of socio-political project of the state, as
being reinforced by the ruling party, Malaysian reformists needed “sites for narratives of
resistance to be created, communicated, and practiced” [44]. In the absent of physical non-
hegemonic civic sites, the blogosphere emerged as one of the sites where the reformists
imagined and re-imagined the possibility of the future that was different than what was forced
by the state. The state’s imagined project to envision an alternative, different, and more
desirable future. Blogging is useful to generate conversations among bloggers and blog readers.
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It is, however, limited in its capacity to facilitate more horizontal interaction and to diffuse
information and grow networks. In its successive developments beyond the imaginaries, social
movement needs to incorporate other tools than just the blogosphere.
Facebook
With the popularity of social media, in 2008 Bersih started incorporating YouTube and Facebook
into its communication and mobilization strategy. Facebook was the second most visited site in
Malaysia after Google. The  rst Facebook page of Bersih 2.0 titled “Bersih 2.0 [Of cial]” was
created only 17 days before the rally day, on 22 June 2011, and within two weeks it attracted
more than 190,000 fans. It functioned mostly as a central news desk where Bersih supporters
posted and checked on updates, announcements, photos, and videos. Beyond Bersih 2.0 rally,
Bersih movement maintains its existence on Facebook by establishing Bersih 3.0 as well as
Bersih 4.0 pages. The latter was created in September 2013 to support the ‘future’ fourth Bersih
rally held in August 2015. The  rst and ‘of cial’ Bersih 2.0 Facebook page, though, continues to
maintain its dominance in terms of total number of fans and activity level.
The Bersih case shows that Facebook served four major functions. First, Bersih activists used
Facebook to connect with large social networks, especially the youth population. In 2008, over
50% of Facebook users in Malaysia were under 25 [43]. Facebook infrastructure allows
conversations to happen in all one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many levels, making it
easy to diffuse information in multiple overlapping networks and to mobilize across diverse
publics. Additionally, it encourages sharing, interacting, and diffusing information in multiple and
overlapped networks. Here, Facebook enabled the rise and expansion of weak-tie networks to
“unlock and expose interpersonal networks to external in uences individuals in distant
networks” [44] thus facilitating the spread of information to the masses and increasing
participation in the movement.
Second, Facebook helps the organization of the movement by facilitating a consensus decision-
making on simple and practical issues. For example, when the Bersih activists’ request to use
Merdeka Stadium for the rally was rejected by the Merdeka Heritage Trust (a Malaysian
government trust who manages Merdeka stadium and Stadium Negara), the rejection letter was
posted on Facebook to solicit quick comments. It quickly generated 344 ‘likes’ and 221
comments nearly all suggesting that the Bersih rally take to the streets and stick with the
original plan. Bersih organizers responded to this request by creating a simple pool with a
question: “Do you agree to keep going with the Bersih 2.0 public assembly?” to which 101,345
voted yes while 89,040 voted no. This kind of public decision-making process happened quite
frequently on Bersih Facebook page. Facebook was particularly important in the preparations
leading to the rally. Bersih users discussed protest sites, gathering locations (for marching), and
sharing maps and information about these places. However, it is important to note that rigorous
conversations and in-depth deliberations do not take place on Facebook. Also, there is lack of
conversation around complex issues such as ethnopolitical divides, economic and social policy,
judicial system, or human rights.
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Third, as it makes it more likely for individuals from different social groups to link to each other,
in the Bersih case Facebook helped temporally bridging diverse publics in interconnected
conversations. The bridging facilitated the emergence of communities that transcend
boundaries of ethnicity and religions, opening possibilities for mobilization across cleavages.
Indeed, both Bersih 2.0 and Bersih 3.0 exemplify a relatively successful mobilization “bridging
sociopolitical cleavages” [11]. Relying heavily on Facebook for its mobilization, the 2012 Bersih
rally brought a diverse mix of about 200,000 Malaysians to the streets of Kuala Lumpur [21].
However, as manifested in the 2015 Bersih 4.0 rally, the unity between various groups was
temporal and did not remove racial and ethnic divisions. Unlike previous rallies, Bersih 4.0 was
dominated by Chinese Malaysian participants. It is estimated that 60% to 80% of the protesters
were Chinese [45]. This situation could be linked to the decision of PAS, whose members are
predominantly Malay, not to mobilize its members for Bersih 4.0. PAS’ formal reasons were
that's “its members would be too preoccupied with preparations for party-related events
scheduled to take place in the weeks ahead and that the chosen dates for Bersih 4 […] were
inappropriate for being too close to [Independence] Day, August 31” [46]. In announcing its
nonparticipation, the PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang implied that the party was excluded
from the planning processes saying that “[…] this Bersih 4 is not headed by us. The agenda is
not by us, it’s by others” [47]. Regardless what the actual reasons were, the incident
demonstrates that while Bersih activists were able to utilize Facebook to form a horizontal
conversational network bridging diverse groups, it is subordinate to the vertical line of command
established within the PAS party. In other words, Facebook facilitated network does enable
Bersih participants to communicate and interact across party lines and, yet, does not remove
the traditional boundaries of party politics or racial dynamics.
It is important to note that the ruling coalition, too, used Facebook in its antagonism to Bersih.
Among the most active governmental social media accounts is the Facebook account of Polis
Diraja Malaysia (PDRM) or the Malaysian Royal Police which by March 2016 had garnered 1.8
million fans. In 2011, in its attempt to counter the Bersih 2.0 movement, PDRM used Facebook to
disseminate a video entitled “Illegal rally Bersih 2.0: A police perspective of 9th July 2011”
documenting various activities of Bersih protesters that were supposedly ‘illegal’.
Twitter
The movement started using Twitter during the Bersih 2.0 in 2011 and continued to use it in the
Bersih 3.0 and 4.0. Unlike Facebook, which was mostly used before and after the protest, Twitter
was predominantly during the physical protest on the rally days. Twitter was used to exchange
on-the-ground updates and information. Protestors and organizers tweeted on where to go,
where to avoid police, places where tear gas and water cannon were deployed, and arrests
made. Many tweets came with links to images and YouTube videos taken from the streets. While
Bersih 2.0 rally produced over 19,000 tweets within twenty-four hours [48], the number jumped
to over 300,000 during the Bersih 3.0 rally and over 440,000 in the Bersih 4.0. Within only six
hours on the rally day of 28 April 2012 there were over 58,000 tweets using #Bersih related
3/4/2018 Sweeping the Unclean: Social Media and the Bersih Electoral Reform Movement in Malaysia | Open Access Journals
http://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/sweeping-the-unclean-social-media-and-the-bersih-electoral-reformmovement-in-malaysia.php?aid… 12/20
hashtags transmitted online. Similarly, Politweet’s [45]. Twitter data on the Bersih 4.0 in 2015
rally also showed a similar pattern. Politweet recorded 583,338 tweets about Bersih from 28
July to 30 August 2015, where 76.6% were made during the rally on 29-30 August (Figures 1-3).
Figure 1: The global heat map of Bersih tweets, 28 April 2012, 01:00-7:00 pm.
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Figure 2: The heat map of Bersih tweets in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Johor Baru, 28 April
2012, 01:00-7:00 pm.
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Observably, in the Bersih case Twitter primarily served two interrelated and, yet, opposing roles:
scaling up the local events to a global scale and, at the same time, intensifying the connection
between various locales. Twitter, to a certain degree, helped globalizing the movement. As can
be seen in Figure 1 the pattern of Twitter usage shows that Bersih related tweets in the 2012
rally originated from various places in the world. Outside Malaysia, Malaysian diaspora
participated in the Bersih movement by holding rallies in the cities and countries they resided as
part of Global Bersih movement. During the Bersih 2.0 rally, there similar protests held in 38
locations in 16 countries. The numbers increased in Bersih 3.0 to 85 locations in 35 countries.
However, a closer look shows that the majority of tweets come from Malaysia (67%), with a
high concentration in Kuala Lumpur, Johor Baru, and Penang (Figure 2). Similarly, the majority of
Figure 3: The heat map of Bersih tweets in Central Kuala Lumpur, 28 April 2012, 01:00-7:00
pm.
3/4/2018 Sweeping the Unclean: Social Media and the Bersih Electoral Reform Movement in Malaysia | Open Access Journals
http://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/sweeping-the-unclean-social-media-and-the-bersih-electoral-reformmovement-in-malaysia.php?aid… 15/20
tweets during the Bersih 4.0 rally in 2015, too, came from Malaysia. In 2015, however, Twitter
was used more by Malaysians in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor with 48.6% of Twitter users
residing in both territories. It is important to note here that Selangor is one of three states won in
the 2013 general elections under the Pakatan Rakyat alliance; PK won in Selangor with 79% of
the votes.
When we look closer at the geotagging map (Figure 3), it is revealed that central Kuala Lumpur
generated the highest number of tweets, especially in areas where the masses gathered and
protested, around the Dataran Merdeka, Masjid Jamek, and Jalan Raja. There were massive
Twitter exchanges about places such as Dataran Merdeka and Masjid Jamek during the protest
and numerous references to place and situation such as: walk to, escape, run from, turn right,
turn around. As Bersih protesters used Twitter with smart phones, digital and street activism in
online and physical urban spaces became near seamless and interlocking.
Among the most disseminated tweets were ones that included photos and YouTube videos of
the confrontation between protesters and the riot police in various locales. Twitter was used in
particular to render con icts visible, globalizing the spaces of con ict that, otherwise, were local.
The visibility of con icts is archetypal to “the capacity of social movements to appropriate
spaces of hegemonic production of visibility” [49]. The Malaysian government through the Royal
Malaysia Police communication channel portrayed Bersih protesters as unclean rioters and
lawbreakers, and the movement as illegal. By using Twitter with links to images and YouTube
videos, Bersih protestors delivered an impressive counter narrative. Twitter was used to ensure
that the movement would always be connected to imageries of mass protests in the streets,
including blockages, tear gas, skirmishes, and police violence and that this visualization would
always go national and global. This tactic was effective, albeit temporarily, that the government
was left with a serious dilemma: how to simultaneously control challenges to its legitimacy and
at the same time tolerate protest in order to appear to meet the basic ideals of ‘democratic’
governance.
It is apparent that Bersih’s use of Twitter, especially in combination with YouTube, has expanded
the alternative space or a counterpower sphere in the highly controlled media landscape.
However, the state and the ruling coalition, too, utilize Twitter as their counter-Bersih tool.
PDRM, or the Malaysian Royal Police, for example, has a Twitter account to provide updates on
policing activities and, in the context of Bersih protests, to respond to activists’ accusations of
abuse. By March 2016, PDRM Twitter account, @pdrmsia, has garnered 144,000 followers.
During the Bersih 3.0 rally, @pdrmsia delivered “Live from PDRM” tweets every 10-15 minutes
to provide its ‘live reports’ from various places in Kuala Lumpur where the rally was held.
Responding to accusations of street violence and police brutality during the Bersih 3.0 rally,
PDRM actively used @pdrmsia to deliver its side of story by releasing selected videos showing
the acts of ‘unlawful rioters’.
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While Twitter increased opportunities of direct communications and political exchanges, its
usages during the Bersih protests, however, did not increase the space for political discussions.
Twitter exchanges revolve around reporting and war tweeting instead of public deliberation.
intermodality: Beyond social media
With 74% of the population resides in urban areas [50], Malaysia is largely urbanized.
Understandably, social media was selected as the key tool of Bersih’s information dissemination
and mobilization. However, the movement still needed to reach rural population. With the limited
or lack of access to the internet in rural areas, Bersih activists utilized other alternative media
such as  yers and SMS (Short Messaging Services delivering text messages using cellular
phones) in their mobilization repertoires.
To disseminate digital-based information beyond the online realm, Bersih activists also initiated
a Balik Kampung Bawa Berita (bring the news back to your hometown) project, which
encouraged Malaysians to share online-based information with their families and friends in the
forms of of ine soft copies (downloaded  les that are accessible of ine through portable
gadgets), hard copies (prints), and CDs [36]. Bersih activists also utilized their corporeal bodies
as a node of information networks by holding traditional ceramah (lectures/speeches) in
mosques and community centers [50-52].
Here, the intermodality, the linkages between the digital media and other types of networks,
was signi cant. The intermodality of social media, SMS,  yers, CDs, portable gadgets and
physical bodies had elevated the ability of the movement in diffusing its messages and expand
its network of activism. In the Bersih case, activists used digital media to break the government’s
control and monopoly over the production of narratives and  ows of information. However, it is
only through intermodality they were able to reach a wide and diverse audience through the
cascading of information from the urban to rural areas using digital media and its linkages to
other media and communication networks.
Despite activists’ attempts to reach rural areas, Bersih’s main reliance on social media might
have contributed to the underrepresentation of rural individuals and groups in the movements.
Arguable, this urban tendency was also re ected in the result of the 2013 General Election,
where votes for Pakatan Rakyat were concentrated in urban areas while Barisan Nasional won
most votes in rural areas such as large parts of Sabah and Sarawak.
Conclusions
From the case of Bersih, we learn that social media is central to activists’ attempt to reform the
electoral system in Malaysia by ‘sweeping the unclean’-any electoral misconducts and practices.
Social media played numerous, differing roles at various junctures and stages of the reform
movement’s journey. In the beginning of the Bersih journey, the Malaysian blogosphere provided
space for reformist individuals who shared some radical understanding and imagination of the
Malaysian politics, which was a necessary precursor of the Bersih movement. In its successive
developments, Bersih activist incorporated Facebook and Twitter as part of the practices of
social movement. My analysis of Bersih shows that the scalable networking capability of
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Facebook and its affordance of horizontal discourse network provided a nascent environment
for widening the practices participation and organization of the movement. Meanwhile, the
portability and swiftness of Twitter made it suitable for real-time communication and
broadcasting during the actual event. It also helped to scale up the protest event from the local
to national and even global level and render the con ict visible.
While opening more possibilities for multiple spaces of resistance and imaginaries as well for
extending networks of participation and mobilization, social media also come with limitations.
While it served as a fertile ground for establishing the core activist network, particularly by
facilitating the brokerage, the blogging was limited in its capacity to expand and grow the
network of the movement. Meanwhile, my analysis also shows that while the horizontal network
structure facilitated by Facebook can increase participation and enhance organization in the
practices of social movements, it does not remove the vertical network structure of party politics.
Also, the temporal unity facilitated by Facebook does not challenge structural racial and ethnic
divisions. For Bersih participants, Twitter was a signi cant tool for sharing and connecting with
each other, distributing counter-narratives (visà- vis the hegemonic narratives of the state), and
globalizing the movement. It, however, falls short in facilitating a deliberative aspect of the
movement. Social media helped Bersih participants to be the information producers and
distributors and, to a certain degree, bypass state’s monopoly of production and circulation of
information. However, in their attempts to reach and expand their networks beyond the urban
population, they needed to establish the intermodality of digital media with other media and
communication networks.
By identifying and analyzing roles of three dominant social media platforms in the Bersih
movement, in this article I reveal that social media is both the site and part of the contestations
of power. Social media is integral to the shaping of Bersih movement’s imaginaries, practices,
and trajectories. Further, the case also shows that as a social and material artifact, every
technological platform such as blogging, Facebook, and Twitter has its own socio-political
properties that postulate distinctive roles and limitations for its users.
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